

Retweet This: Participation, Collective Production, and New Paradigms of Cultural Production

Louise Fabian and Jaron Rowan

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Creativity has never been an individual or isolated activity, despite the fact that some policymakers and regulators would suggest so. In the last thirty years, we have seen a tremendous growth in policy frameworks, economic models, schemes, programmes, and discourses that have been designed in order to transform cultural practices into economic activities.

The promotion of the figure of the cultural entrepreneur, the widespread promotion of intellectual property, and the valuation of culture as a resource are in this chapter going to be understood as part of the neoliberalisation of the wider economy. This process first occurred under the guise of the cultural industries, rebranded later as the creative industries, as the main discursive and political framework promoted by institutions and policymakers. This has also triggered the growth of theories and debates aimed at conceptualising the underlying notions of wealth and value that have taken place during these transformations and the changes in the nature of labour after the so-called immaterialisation of the economy.

In the introduction of this book, economic normativity is defined as the operative indistinction of the economic and the moral. If we look at the period and the cases that will be explored in this chapter, we see how ideas, discourses, and practices of, for example, free software, intellectual property, creative industries, or creative labour share this double facet of being simultaneously economic and moral. This can be observed both in the discourses promoting the benefits and values of capitalising on creativity and cultural products, and in the set of norms and practices of those who try to resist the treatment of creativity as a profitable and controllable product, such as the Free Software movement and the fight against the politics and rhetoric of intellectual property.

In the following, we will examine how notions of creativity and work have been deployed and reformulated in these discourses. This can help us understand an important shift in the ways contemporary culture is being produced. In his book *Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software*, Christopher M. Kelty has explored the history and cultural significance of Free Software and free culture movements. Kelty explores how the internet and Free Software are what he diagnoses as a “recurrent public”¹ and what the recurrent public makes, builds, and maintains. We will contribute to this existing literature by taking a closer look at specific examples of forms of participation, collaboration, and communitarian practices that go beyond the Like and the Retweet forms of collective production, forms that provide insight into new ways in which culture and economy meet. The chapter explores how individual forms of creativity are challenged by plural and complex forms of collective creativity in which collaboration and co-production become distinctive traits. The inherent problems in the instrumentalisation of culture and creativity will be explored, together with a focus on how this development has walked hand in hand with a new interest in creativity as a form of collective project.

The growing interest in emergent processes of peer-to-peer (P2P) urbanism, self-organisation, and commons-based cultural enterprises provides new spaces for socioeconomic cultural production. Projects such as Wikipedia, the emergence of Free Software, autonomous publishers, and so on are showing us how new powerful collective cultural artefacts are coming into being but also how

1 Christopher M. Kelty, *Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

these can be economically sustainable. The interest in cultural production as a collective project is related to a longing for an experimentation with new forms of sociality. We see a growing interest in the social practices of producing and consuming in common, in rethinking ideas of community, sociality, and politics, and in experimenting with new organisational principles.

In recent years, experiments around direct action and civil disobedience have taken place in many parts of the world. These forms of discontent and struggles over capitalism and traditional notions of representative democracy experiment with new forms of creating value, consuming, and producing in common, and are an important context for understanding the analysed turn towards a horizontalisation of cultural and social practices and the experimentations with informal and alternative economies. The growth of community-based cultural activities and enterprises are furthermore part of the ongoing desire in social movements and street politics after what Banu Bargu has called “commoning as a new political horizon.”²

From Cultural Industries to Creative Industries

The British scholar David Hesmondhalgh argues that at the end of the 1970s, the term “culture industry” “was picked up by French sociologists and by activists and policy makers and was converted to the term ‘cultural industries.’”³ By doing so they wanted to move away from the negative qualities the concept inherited from the Frankfurt School and show, contrary to what Adorno and Horkheimer argued, that this was not a monolithic industry but that it covered an array of different practices and business models. In this sense, the cultural industries, when first conceived, constituted a progressive developmental model that became attractive to city planners, cultural managers, and policymakers, as it promised a new paradigm based on creativity, equality, and coolness⁴.

In the UK, the cultural industries were first promoted and used as a growth strategy by the Greater London Council (GLC), which in the mid 1980s started the Cultural Industries Unit in order to regulate the sector⁵. At that time this administrative body was in the hands of the Labour Party of Great Britain and constituted one of the only political institutions to have escaped the reach of neoliberalism and Thatcher’s influence. Together with the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB), during the 1980s they published some of the most relevant policy briefings and documents that shaped and gave the conditions to the development of the cultural industries, including *Altered Images*, *The London Industrial Strategy: The Cultural Industries*, and most importantly, *Saturday Night or Sunday Morning*⁶.

In all of these documents we can see two defined strands of arguments: on the one hand, a clear attempt to show how culture can be an important source of wealth, and on the other hand, a movement from subsidised forms of culture to more economically sustainable (and popular) forms of culture. Traditional forms of avant-gardist art and elitist forms of expression are suppressed in favour of more popular and commercial cultural forms. Still, we must not forget that these policies were made from a progressive perspective and that the cultural industries were devised as a more

2 Banu Bargu, “The politics of commensality” in *The Anarchist Turn*, eds. Jacob Blumenfield, Chiara Bottici and Simon Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 51.

3 David Hesmondhalgh, *The Cultural Industries* (London: Sage, 2007), 15.

4 Rosalind Gill, “Cool, creative and egalitarian?: exploring gender in project-based new media work in Europe,” *Information, Communication & Society* 5 (2002): 70–89.

5 Justin Lewis, *Art, Culture and Enterprise: The Politics of Art and the Cultural Industries* (London: Routledge, 1990), 33.

6 Geoff Mulgan and Ken Worpole, *Saturday Night or Sunday Morning: From Arts to Industry – New Forms of Cultural Policy* (London: Routledge, 1986).

sustainable response to the current of privatisation that the UK was undergoing. As Alan Finlayson puts it:

[A]n alternative model explicitly connecting cultural policy to consumer culture was produced by the GLC, in which the agenda was to politicize mass cultural forms and develop the Greater London Enterprise Board, the GLC established community recording studios, non-commercial video distribution in public libraries, and independent and radical book distribution co-ops and publishing houses. This progressive cultural industries approach emanated from the GLC's Economic Policy Group⁷.

In this sense, there is a clear political ambivalence in the concept as it deploys a model for the economisation of culture whilst discursively confronting neoliberal assumptions. For example, Mulgan and Worpole combine a Marxist rhetoric with the need to justify the transformation of culture into an economic asset. They write: The cultural industries which produce the words, sounds, images and meanings that surround and bombard us have been immensely dynamic in the recent years. The Marxist superstructure, the realm of ideas and ideologies, has become a primary motor for the economic base⁸. This combination of a Marxist analysis and a model of industrial organisation will tend to lose its political implications as the discourse around the cultural industries develops, but still it is interesting to see how originally there was a will to overcome the austerity and privatisation imposed by neoliberal policies with a model in which culture was a central element of development.

The cultural industries were, however, often Fordist infrastructures aimed at extracting value from cultural goods. These could be private or publicly owned (publishing houses or national heritage elements), and their production mode was still characterised by serialisation (books, records, clothes) and mass appeal (big museums of cultural spaces aimed at attracting tourism) of cultural goods, but in all cases, they were still dependent on tangible assets (cultural objects, buildings, actors, and so on)⁹. Policies designed to promote the cultural industries still relied on big productive infrastructures and promotion by big cultural conglomerates. This only started to change when immaterial assets were detected as productive elements and when the idea that creativity could be something socially produced started to become accepted by policymakers.

The clearest example of this happened in 1994, when the Australian government designed a bold set of policies with the aim of promoting the continent's economy. Under the name of Creative Nation: Commonwealth Cultural Policy¹⁰, this was the first public policy document in which the notion of the "creative sector" appeared. Under this concept they included a set of micro-enterprises, freelance and independent workers who functioned on the margins of the mainstream cultural industries but could still constitute a quantifiable source of value. These entities were relatively small compared to large cultural corporations but were considered a key element to understanding the new forms of production emerging in the cities. This important piece of cultural policy discusses the need to valorise cultural heritage in order to attract cultural tourism, defines the idea of culture as both a form of collective identity and as an economic asset, and most importantly, locates creativity as one of the most important factors of production of wealth in contemporary economies. One of the key aspects introduced in this policy document was the need

7 Alan Finlayson, "New Labour" in *Cultural capitalism: Politics after New Labour*, eds. Jeremy Bewes and Jeremy Gilbert (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2000), 211.

8 Mulgan and Worpole, *Saturday Night or Sunday Morning*, 10.

9 Ben Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000).

10 Australian Government, *Creative Nation: Commonwealth Cultural Policy* (1994). Available at: <http://www.nla.gov.au/creative.nation/contents.html>

to implement a strong intellectual property framework in order to help transform the latent wealth inherent in culture into economic returns. This idea was later introduced and lies at the core of a set of policies and economic programmes designed in the United Kingdom. For the first time, tangible and intangible elements of culture are pointed out as possible sources of wealth. This will give rise to a completely new set of discourses on the valorisation of culture.

The Cultural Entrepreneur Enters the Scene

In 1997, with the rise of Tony Blair as Britain's prime minister following a landslide victory of the Labour Party in the general election, the creative industries were assigned a central role in the economic development programme for the UK, but with a key conceptual twist: the term "cultural" was exchanged with the term "creative," giving rise to what they branded as the "creative industries." Under this new rhetoric a series of subjects and practices that had functioned under different logics, based more on collective work and networks of trust and friendship, were suddenly encouraged to become enterprises. The Department for Culture, Media, and Sport defined the creative industries as "those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent which have a potential for job and wealth creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property."¹¹

This umbrella term aimed at integrating a whole array of different practices under the same policy framework. In this sense, one of its most interesting characteristics is that it conceived design, painting, or music as an industry. With the promotion of a new figure, the cultural entrepreneur, the creative industries aimed at radically altering the traditional ways in which culture would be funded in order to design a reality in which cultural production became the forefront of the knowledge economy. The figure of the cultural entrepreneur helped to reproduce the premise of "individual creativity" that was contained in the original definition of the creative industries.

Social Cooperation and Contemporary Capitalism

Before we look into specific cases of cultural production based on social cooperation, we will explore some of the ideas put forward by post-autonomous Marxists who argue that social cooperation, far from being an abnormality, constitutes the basis of contemporary capitalism. They argue that we are experiencing a shift in the mode of production that goes from a Fordist tradition (based on the manipulation of raw materials and physical human power) to a post-Fordist era in which information, knowledge, signs, and aesthetics shape the way we produce. In this age of cognitive capitalism¹² the Fordist production line stops being embedded in the factory and becomes de-materialised. The argumentation goes that if production in cognitive capitalism occurs as a result of the articulation and cooperation of brains, if labour has become immaterial and the results of labour are intangible assets, then we should reformulate the nature of these collectively created "products." Authors such as Antonella Corsani¹³, Paolo Virno¹⁴, Tiziana Terranova¹⁵, and Maurizio Lazzarato¹⁶, taking their cue from Mario Tronti¹⁷, have from different perspectives explored the ways in which this "social cooperation" is a central feature of cognitive capitalism.

11 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Creative Industries Mapping Document (London: DCMS, 1998).

12 Yann Moulier Boutang, *Cognitive Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

13 Antonella Corsani, "Hacia una renovación de la economía política" in *Capitalismo Cognitivo*, eds. Raúl Sanchez and Emmanuel Rodriguez (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2004), 89–99.

14 Paolo Virno, *Virtuosismo y revolución* (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2003).

15 Tiziana Terranova, *Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

16 Maurizio Lazzarato, *Por una política menor. Acontecimiento y política en las sociedades de control* (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2006).

17 Mario Tronti, *Obreros y capital* (Madrid: Akal, 2001).

The factory has lost its centrality as the central locus of production in the Western world. Production now takes place in any given place of what has been termed the social factory. The limits between work and leisure have for many people been erased. The laws of value have been replaced by new forms of valorisation of non-rival and abundant informational goods. This happens in part because what are being produced are not material objects but signs, or combinations of these two elements. These signs are mobile, exchangeable, and can be recombined and reproduced endlessly. The production of signs, language, and relations is made by the cooperation of millions of subjects connected through non-linear networks of production and reproduction. Work, as Virno argues, consists “no longer in the carrying out of a single particular objective, but in the modulating (as well as the varying and intensifying) of social cooperation, in other words, that ensemble of relations and systemic connections that as of now are the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth¹⁸.”

The walls of the factory have become porous, and enterprises seek ways to capture these flows of cooperation. Production now starts “outside the enterprise, the cooperation among brains is ontologically previous to its capture. In this cooperation a power of co-creation and co-production is expressed.¹⁹” The Italian economist Antonella Corsani has underscored the limitations of the factory and the Fordist space, and the ways in which this is superseded by forms of creativity that go beyond its limited confines. She explains that “the opening-up of the factory, the distribution of new forms of cooperation within the cracks created by the Fordist enterprise, and, in short, the fact that innovation escapes the control of big business constitute a new productive reality that must be taken into account.²⁰” We can hereby discern that social cooperation is not just an anecdotal or marginal phenomenon, but rather it lies right at the centre of a series of economic and social transformations that has taken place on a global scale.

In this intellectual tradition, knowledge, affects, and information are perceived as a commons that feed contemporary production. This raw material flows and comes into being through conversations, exchanges of ideas, emails, phone calls, drawings, songs, and so on. So the problem for contemporary capitalism is finding ways to capture these signs and ideas and transform them into particular commodities. In this sense one could argue that contemporary capitalism extracts value by stopping cooperation from taking place. This is done by limiting the remixing of ideas, contents, or images, and introducing artificial boundaries in order to create scarcity.

The mechanism established to capture the value derived from intangible assets and to limit the uses of the fruits of social cooperation is intellectual property. This convention helps to construct an idea of scarcity aimed at restricting the circulation of signs, ideas, and other constellations of knowledge. If intangible or informational assets constitute non-rival goods²¹, the only way to pretend they are scarce entities with a limited use is by constructing an artificial framework that surrounds these goods. This legal artefact resingularises collective endeavours, it breaks down the flows of collective cooperation, and it determines a specific author who should be remunerated as if he or she were the true creators of that portion of knowledge. The immanent power bred from the articulation of brains becomes objectified in a piece of private property: “IP has a political function, as it determines who has the right to create and who has the right to reproduce. IP separates the multitude from its ability to create problems and provide solutions to these problems.²²”

18 Virno, *Virtuosismo y revolución*, 94.

19 Lazzarato, *Por una política menor*, 117.

20 Corsani, “Hacia una renovación,” 91.

21 Yochai Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

22 Lazzarato, *Por una política menor*, 121.

Therefore, IP functions on a double level: It constitutes an economic instrument and a political reality. It works as a regulator for the market and as a social mediator. It decides who can access knowledge and what can be done with that knowledge. It is only by understanding how IP can be deployed in order to extract value from the knowledge and ideas produced collectively by communities and social groups that we can then understand the interest and political implications derived from a series of projects and initiatives which aim at generating goods that are managed and enjoyed by the communities.

Cultural Production Based on New Forms of Social Cooperation

In the following pages, we will identify contemporary examples of creative and cultural practices where cooperation is central to cultural production, despite the normative framework of policies, schemes, and institutions aimed at promoting the creative industries and its implicit notion of individual creativity. These cases show us different gradients of collaboration and present a set of degrees of autonomy that is worth examining and taking into account. Another feature that distinguishes these practices is that intellectual property, far from being the solution to funding cultural practices, in many of these cases are perceived by the involved actors as an obstacle and a technical impediment to promoting these forms of collaboration and communitarian practices.

Virtual Environments Encouraging Participation

If we look at the virtual environments that are designed to encourage participation, we can observe two different strategies operating. This has been noted and discussed by the Dutch scholar Mirko Tobias Schäfer, who in his book *Bastard Culture!: How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production* distinguishes implicit and explicit forms of collaboration. He argues that “participation has become a key concept used to frame the emerging media practice. It considers the transformation of former audiences into active participants and agents of cultural production on the Internet.²³” He describes different discourses operating: “The promise of social progress and a reconfiguration of power through participation are embedded in technological development and postulated anew with each ‘media revolution.’²⁴” Participatory platforms are environments in which specific elements can be modified or engaged with. Contents can be uploaded and exchanged. In most of these spaces (consider the difference between sites such as OpenStreetMap, a blog, or Facebook) there are very specific laws and protocols that define how participation can take place.

Wikipedia is a clear example of a very robust set of rules, hierarchies, and possibilities that has been defined in order to keep an unstable platform under certain parameters of stability²⁵. In this case, the rules have been defined by the community of users, and can be modified if enough critical mass is ready to approve a certain change. In other participatory platforms these rules have been designed from above, as in the case of Instagram, in which recent rules have been introduced alienating and disempowering a major portion of its users. The design of these environments shapes the degree of participation that can take place; in some cases participation is embedded in the system, and users are not even aware that they are interacting or co-producing with other subjects. Notoriously, platforms such as Microsoft gather data from its users, which is then analysed and serves to redesign or fix bugs in its software. We also see a growing number of what Schäfer has termed “explicit participation” driven by motivation²⁶. Examples of the latest are,

23 Mirko Tobias Schäfer, *Bastard Culture!: How User Participation Transforms Cultural Production* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 10.

24 Schäfer, *Bastard Culture!*, 13.

25 Mayo Fuster Morell, “Online creation communities for the building of digital commons: Participation as an ecosystem?,” (2009). Available at: http://openfsm.net/projects/freecultureforum/preparation-discussion-and-working-materials/MayoFusterMorell_ParticipationAsAnEco_Barcelona.pdf

26 Schäfer, *Bastard Culture!*

for instance, platforms designed by fans in order to translate and subtitle movies and television series, in which the work is fragmented and distributed among many users; blogs, in which people comment and interact with the writers; and projects that enable new products to be created or that promote new forms of research, in which participation is modulated by sets of rules.

One of the main critiques of this “participatory culture paradigm” is the economic model that underlies it. Cognitive capitalism needs to capture flows of knowledge in order to generate surplus value. Participation platforms are ideal mechanisms to allow this to happen. In the case of Facebook it is clear in this respect. The platform allows—as we will also see when looking at participatory urban planning process—for very specific and limited forms of participation and by doing so generates a very powerful database of trends, customs, and personal information that it can later repackage and sell. In this sense, the economic model that underlies this type of participation is that of “free labour” as defined by Tiziana Terranova²⁷. We see how the capture and commoditisation of the commons takes place. Every time Facebook asks its users “how are you doing today,” “what is happening,” and so on, it is asking them to feed information that can later be sold as statistical data.

We will now look more closely at the strategies and self-understandings of new production models based on cooperation that do not follow the prescriptive model that is proposed by creative industry advocates. We see how in some cases official regulations have not been completely bypassed or dismissed but rather adapted and remixed in ways that serve the communities’ interests. The now well-established Creative Commons licence is designed to allow the sharing and exchange of culture in order to generate new hybrid economies²⁸. In other cases, we see licenses designed in order to keep articulations of knowledge available to specific communities but at the same time regulate their use by corporations or elements alien to these communities. This is the case with the Copyfarleft licence designed by Dmytri Kleiner²⁹. In other cases, as we will see later, contents or designs are shared openly through P2P networks, giving the final decision to the different members of the communities to sell these items or not.

Urban Planning Performed by Sociocultural Participation

In the performing and planning of the actual physical urban space, we can observe a new interest in utilising participatory processes. The interest in the pluralist operative processes of the city stems from both a tactic and a strategic level. Urban planners, architects, developers, and public institutions are increasingly experimenting with small-scale improvements and temporary use performed by DIY activists, as potential ways of staging or trying out possibilities for longer-term investments. Municipalities are permanently implementing short-term, low-budget liveability improvements initiated by citizen-activists.

The participatory planning processes are often used in a new form of affective spatial production. In the immaterial and cultural re-enactments of the industrial and Fordist city, the user and citizen gains a role as the tactical and opportunistic creative agent transforming the city into local temporary utopias. Do-it-yourself (DIY) cultural re-enactments of the industrial architecture often work through affective aesthetics, as aesthetical re-enactments of existing urban materialities, and architecture such as the factory, infrastructure, or harbour dock.

27 Terranova, *Network Culture*.

28 Lawrence Lessig, *Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008).

29 Dmytri Kleiner, *The Telekommunist Manifesto* (Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2010).

Participatory urban design is typically produced at the site, through the direct involvement of its (future) users, who engage in, perform, and design the future outline of the site. Participatory urban design differs radically from the understanding of urban design as objects or durable architecture. Rather, participatory urban designs are acts of designing *in situ*, and rely on the engagement of the activist, user, and artist. Even though participatory planning processes are from the start motivated by democratic and egalitarian ambitions and policies of inclusion, these goals often end up being compromised by the effectual inequalities of the actors involved, either as stagers of the process or as invited participants.

Developers strategically work with temporary spaces, playgrounds, and cultural activities as part of the strategic planning of the area. The major problem here is obviously that it often risks being merely a performative staging, aimed at attracting the attention of the creative class through participation, play, and informal design. It might involve temporary urban art or the engagement of users through experience, but it does not allow citizens to fundamentally shape, change, or redesign the premises of their influence on their urban everyday space. Thus, what may appear as DIY cultures and bottom-up initiatives are at the same time heavily supported by strategic communication in which developers see a direct linkage between the everyday staging of urban qualities in the neighbourhood by the citizens themselves and the future financial output of the developers' investment.

A Commons-based Enterprise

Finally, we will examine an enterprise whose whole business structure and operating system is designed in order to generate and protect the knowledge commons. Traficantes de Sueños (TdS) is a cultural enterprise that does not follow the guidelines that have been promoted by official agencies. It is a project that was born in the form of a collective 15 years ago in response to many of the debates and transformations to do with social movements taking place in Spain during the 1990s. Given the global crisis affecting activist organisations at large and, more particularly, the crisis that in Spain put the role of squatted spaces in question, new tools were needed to help redefine the identity of social movements. Up until that moment, these had refused the possibility of conceiving their productivity in economic terms, so much so that discussions about money and forms of valorising their work were basically banned. Debates about the effectiveness of political actions completely eclipsed and prevailed over all other matters.

Today, TdS has ten employees on the payroll, spacious premises in Madrid, a bookshop, a publishing and distribution house, and a design workshop. The decision-making process at TdS takes place in the form of assembly discussions, something which it has inherited from the different social and political movements its members came out of. This decision-making model clashes with the management model taught and implemented in the cultural enterprise incubators, where autonomous decision-making and individualisation of work are promoted.

One of the members of the collective says that they opted to explore the notion of “political entrepreneurship”: that is to say, to think of the enterprise as an element whose function it is “to transform the social and political common into an economic element, in order to dynamise processes of transformation” (from interview with a member of TdS in June 2010). TdS publishes 15–20 books a year. All of them are licensed under a Creative Commons licence, which allows the texts to be downloaded for free from the publishing house website and then to be distributed via social networks. This form of return to the communities establishes and strengthens their links with the initiative. The collective is aware of the debt it owes to the social and political movement. Its model of internal organisation is reminiscent of the models designed to manage the com-

mons: that is, the norms, control mechanisms, and governance structures that are established in order to render the project sustainable, to structure the community of people that make it up, and to manage the different services it offers.

The members of TdS understand themselves to be working with a commons composed of the ideas, discourses, and tensions that emerge out of the social movements. They manage the commons that constitutes the knowledge, know-how, and governance models that have allowed the project to exist for years. The initiative has established a network of bookshops and self-publishing projects, the accumulation of knowledge and infrastructures, and the constitution of distribution and broadcasting channels for their contents. This infrastructure is open, and it can be infiltrated and used by other collectives or groups that need to distribute their ideas or works. The rules that shape the space are negotiated by the local communities who inhabit it. The profits generated are distributed evenly among the different members and contributors to the project.

Conclusion

We have seen how the normative production model designed by policy-makers (broadly known as the creative industries) has been surpassed by initiatives that have proved that creativity, far from being an individual enterprise, is always a collective process. Top-down-based models have been contrasted with models that emerge from self-organisation and autonomous initiatives. The growth of commons-based enterprises and the development towards commons-based production systems within the cultural economy are closely connected to a widespread interest in rethinking “the commons,” and to the horizontalisations of politics within the social movements.

We have above diagnosed a reorientation from participation to autonomy, from free labour to more sustainable production models in which the communities can decide over the economic profits derived from their cooperation. The paradigm of joining economy and culture—and utilising culture and creativity as a catalyst of economic growth—has reached a new phase and therefore needs new analytic tools. This is a phase dominated by ideals and practices of participation, P2P production, user-generated content, DIY ethos, informal economies, and new forms of horizontal organisation. As Boltanski and Chiapello 30 have convincingly shown, capitalism can seem unbeatable in its ability to adapt to and incorporate these new forms of production and existential and aesthetic modi. However, we also see in the development of new forms of informal economies and self-organised cultural production new political, social, and economic cultures, organisations, and ideals.

Summing up, we suggest a critical re-evaluation of the paradigm of participation by arguing that moving towards a commons-based production system would imply that the communities have the right not only to perform participation in pre-scripted choreographies, but to decide how the value of their commons-produced knowledge and spaces are managed and shared. The economic normativity of creative and participative forms of contemporary economy can thus be said to have undergone important changes within the past decades here analysed. From the end of the 1970s, we see encouragements to develop cultural industries that are both economically motivated and linked to an ambition of a democratisation of culture. Gradually, however (and especially from the 1990s onwards), the neoliberal heralding of the cultural entrepreneur has become dominating and network-based cultural production has more and more been conceived as the forefront of the knowledge economy. Finally, we now see new social and creative movements and forms of production emerging, which criticise the ways culture is being privatised and utilised in a neoliberal capitalist economy.

Significantly, these new movements and collectives cannot be appropriated under aesthetic or democratic categories because (unlike the cultural industries of the 1970s) their aim is not improvements of certain features of a fundamentally capitalist society (through participation, creativity, design, and so on), but a thoroughgoing critique of economic normativities in capitalist economy as such—that is, concerning especially producer and user rights, as well as the relation between social forms of production and the commodification and individualisation in capitalism. While criticising the implicit normativities structuring the private property regime of neoliberal capitalism, the actors and developments analysed are making their own normative claims about the economy, suggesting to embed it in moral values of community, use value, and non-monetary exchanges.